## Message Text

SECRET

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44

ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /031 W

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R 230427Z MAR 74

FM AMEMBASSY TAIPEI

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1305

**SECDEF** 

JCS

CINCPAC

COMUSTDC

CHMAAG/ROC

SECRETTAIPEI 1816

**EXDIS** 

SPECAT CINCPAC EXCLUSIVE FOR ADMIRAL GAYLER COMUSTDC SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR V/ADM BESHANY: CMAAG/ROC RPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR M/G NASH

EO 11652 GDS

TAGS PFOR MILI MASS TW US SUBJECT: MAAG PERSONNEL STRENGTH AND COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS IN TAIWAN

REF JCS 042213Z MAR 1974

- 1. ALTHOUGH AMBASSADOR UNGER WILL HAVE THE ONGOING RESPONSIBILITY, I WISH TO COMMENT BEFORE LEAVING TAIPEI ON THE QUESTIONS OF FUTURE MAAG STAFFING AND US COMMAND RELATIONSHIPIS ON TAIWAN.
- 2. WITH SOME RELUCTANCE I HAVE CONCURRED IN THE JCS PROPOSAL TO REDUCE MAAG AUTHORIZATION TO 50 US PERSONNEL IN FY '75 ON THE EXPLICIT UNDERSTANDING THAT THE PHASEDOWN BE GRADUAL AND COMPLETED ONLY NEAR THE END OF FY '75, I.E. MID-CALENDAR 1975. M/G NASH FEELS HE CAN CARRY OUT HIS MISSION WITH SUCH ARRANGEMENTS AND HAS FORWARDED DETAILED PLANS FOR DOING SO. WHEN THE GRC LEARNS OF THIS ACCELERATED DRAWDOWN ITS REACTION SECRET

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WILL INEVITABLY BE SOMEWHAT ADVERSE, BUT THE NEGATIVE

IMPACT SHOULD BE AT LEAST PARTLY OFFSET IF WE CAN INFORM THE GRC OF THE WORLDWIDE SCOPE OF SIMILAR REDUCTIONS IN MAAG STAFFING.

- 3. IN VIEW OF THE DOWNWARD TREND IN OUR MILITARY DEPLOYMENT ON TAIWAN, I RECOGNIZE WE WILL NOT BE ABLE TO DEFER MUCH LONGER NEW COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS TO ACHIEVE STAFF ECONOMIES AND PERSHAPS BETTER COORDINATION AND CONTROL BY HIGHER HEADQUARTERS. APART FROM CHANGES IN THE 327TH WHICH I PRESUME WILL PARALLEL OTHER CHANGES IN OUR AIR FORCE DEPLOYMENTS, THE MOST OBVIOUS MOVE WOULD BE SOME KIND OF MERGER OF MAAG AND TDC, HOPEFULLY RETAINING THE IDENTIFICATION OF BOTH ENTITIES THROUGH DOUBLE-HATTING. I AM REASONABLY SURE THE GRC SURMISES THAT SUCH A MERGER IS ONLY A MATTER OF TIME, AND IF WE PROCEED WITH ADEQUATE CAUTION AND SUFFICIENT LEAD TIME, WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO MAKE THE ADJUSTMENT WITHOUT EXCESSIVE POLITICAL DAMAGE.
- 4. I DO NOT WISH TO COMMENT ON THE STRICTLY US MILITARY FACTORS INVOLVED IN A MERGER. BUT FROM A POLITICAL POINT OF VIEW, I CONSIDER IT ESSENTIAL THAT A MERGER BE SET SUFFICIENTLY FAR IN ADVANCE TO ALLOW THE GRC, ESPECIALLY THE PREMIER, TIME TO ADJUST TO THE CONCEPT, AND THAT THE IMPLEMENTING MOVES BE CAREFULLY PHASED SO AS NOT TO HEIGHTEN UNHELPFUL EFFECTS OF US MILITARY DRAWDOWNS PLANNED FOR IMPLEMENTATIN IN THE SAME TIME FRAME. FOR EXAMPLE, THE WORST POSSIBLE PROCEDURE WOULD BE TO CONFRONT CCK ON SHORT NOTICE WITH AN ACTUAL MERGER WHICH VIRTUALLY ELIMINATED MAAG AT THE SAME TIME AS A MAJOR WITHDRAWAL SUCH AS REDEPLOYMENT OF OUR FIRST F-4 SQUADRON.
- 5. I QUESTION WHETHER GREAT SAVINGS OF PERSONNEL WILL BE POSSIBLE UNTIL TDC AND MAAG CAN BE PHYSICALLY CONSOLIDATED IN ONE LOCATION WHICH I DOUBT CAN BE ACHIEVED THIS CALENDAR YEAR. ACCORDINGLY, I PROPOSE THAT A REAL MERGER BE POSTPONED UNTIL NEXT YEAR WHEN MAAG APPROACHES THE 50-MAN AUTHORIZED LEVEL. THIS WOULD ALLOW TIME FOR US TO CONTINUE OUR WITHDRAWALS SECRET

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WITHOUT UNNECESSARILY INCREASING THE PREMIER'S BURDEN OF EXPLAINING OUR ACGIONS TO HIS MILITARY COLLEAGUES AND OTHERS. IF WE DECIDE ON SUCH TIMING, I BELIEVE IT WOULD BE A USEFUL CONDITIONING PROCESS IF WE WERE ABLE TO TELL CCK SOMETIME DURING THEE HEXT FEW MONTHS THAT WHEN MAAG DROPS TO ITS REDUCED 50-MAN TARGET-IN PARALLEL WITH REDUCTIONS IN MAAGS ELSEWHERE--WE WILL BE FORCED TO MAKE MORE CONOMICAL USE OF OUR PERSONNEL

AND HENCE WILL MERGE TDC AND MAAG. WE COULD EMPHASIZE THAT WE WOULD MAINTAIN THE IDENTITY OF MAAG AND DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO ACCOMMODATE THE PREMIER'S DESIRE TO AVOID IMPLICATIONS OF A DEFENSE DISENGAGEMENT FROM TAIWAN.

MCCONAUGHY

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NNN

## Message Attributes

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